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SNYDER V. PHELPS NOTE

Snyder v. Phelps: Finding the Light at the End of the Tort
Brendan Mackesey*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perplexing. This word aptly describes First Amendment jurisprudence
surrounding tort claims. A number of indeterminable standards masquerade as
doctrine for such claims: Is the plaintiff a public or private party? What of the
defendant? Does the speech at issue regard a matter of public concern? Is it an
assertion of fact? Was the plaintiff in a “public place?” Was he or she part of a
“captive audience?” In Snyder v. Phelps,1 the Supreme Court has a chance to
clarify some of these benchmarks. However, the Court must be wary of the influx
of tort litigation its holding could trigger.
Snyder presents three questions for the Supreme Court:
(1) Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell2 apply to a private
person versus another private person concerning a private
matter?
(2) Does the First Amendment’s freedom of speech tenet trump
the First Amendment’s freedom of religion and peaceful
assembly?
(3) Does an individual attending a family member’s funeral
constitute a captive audience who is entitled to state protection
from unwanted communication?3

Analyzing these issues, the Court will determine whether a father is
entitled to damages from a religious fundamentalist group that picketed with
anti‐homosexual propaganda outside his son’s funeral.4 Specifically, the Court’s
ruling will dictate whether a religious group may be held liable for such picketing
* Brendan Mackesey is a law student at the University of Miami and winner of the 2010
University of Miami Law Review Writing Competition.
1
580 F. 3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
2
485 U.S. 46 (1987).
3
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23,
2009).
4
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009). The plaintiff’s son in Snyder was a
marine who had recently been killed in Iraq. Id. For a detailed synopsis of the facts in
Snyder, see infra Part II.A.
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under three tort claims: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2)
invasion of privacy; and (3) civil conspiracy.5
In June 2006, Albert Snyder filed suit bringing these tort claims against
the Westboro Baptist Church and its founder, Fred Phelps, Sr., in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland.6 When Snyder filed his complaint, he
presumably did not realize the significant First Amendment questions his case
presented (let alone the political reaction it would trigger7). In fact, the district
court explicitly downplayed the First Amendment’s importance in the suit.8 The
Fourth Circuit, however, capitalized on the opportunity to expound upon such a
high profile area of law.
Before delving into its analysis, the Fourth Circuit provided a brief history
lesson of First Amendment jurisprudence arising from tort claims.9 After citing
several important Supreme Court cases,10 the Fourth Circuit focused on
Milkovich – a relatively recent case addressing a libelous newspaper column.11 In
Milkovich, the Supreme Court dispelled the notion that the First Amendment
provides a “defamation exemption” for anything that can be classified as
opinion.12 However, the Court clarified that the First Amendment does protect
statements that cannot be “reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts” about
an individual.13 The Fourth Circuit relied on this clarification holding that
Westboro’s communications regarding Snyder and his son were constitutionally
protected14 and overturning a $5 judgment against Westboro.15
5

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at page i, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec.
23, 2009).
6
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 210 (4th Cir. 2009). Snyder filed a total of five tort
claims. However, the district court granted summary judgment to Westboro on the (1)
defamation and (2) publicity given to private life claims. Id. at 213. Snyder also added
two additional members of Westboro as defendants. Id. at 212.
7
Twenty‐seven legislative bodies have acted on funeral picketing since Snyder’s
inception. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free
Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 308 (2008)
(Citation omitted).
8
See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 579 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010) (“This case . . . does not involve . . . any
prohibition of Defendants’ First Amendment rights of religious expression.”).
9
See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2009).
10
See id. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1987); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1949); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 284–86 (1964); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–46 (1974)).
11
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 1.
12
Id. at 18.
13
See id. at 20 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 50).
14
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
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This note argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the Fourth
Circuit’s judgment. In doing so, the Court needs to articulate its benchmark for
similar speech‐based tort claims. After reviewing prior case law in Part II, Part III
discusses Snyder in depth. Part IV argues that the tort claims here must fail and
touches on the ramifications of a judgment for Snyder; notably, the massive
amount of litigation that would arise should this type of offensive expression be
deemed a tort. Part V offers a final reminder to the Supreme Court.
II. A BRIEF INSIGHT INTO RELATED FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has adopted plenty of speech‐based tort doctrine
over the years,16 none more featured (or scrutinized) than the “actual malice”
standard. A statement is made with actual malice if it is made “with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 17 This
definition was provided in New York Times (in 1964), where the Supreme Court
refused to hold a newspaper company liable for defamation of a public official.18
The standard was relied upon in subsequent cases favoring freedom of the press,
such as Gertz,19 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,20 and Associated Press v. Walker.21
Although the Court has acknowledged that malice is an “elusive, abstract
concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove,”22 the Court did not explicitly favor
a different approach until the end of the 20th Century.23

15

See id.
See Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost? : Snyder v. Phelps and Speech‐Based
Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO, June 2010, at 1.
17
New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see also Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S., 749, 766 (1984).
18
New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280.
19
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court
held that a private individual must show actual malice to recover punitive damages from
a publisher or broadcaster for defamation. See id. at 347.
20
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974) (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967)). In Curtis Publishing Co., the Supreme Court extended
the actual malice standard to plaintiffs who are public figures. Id.
21
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974) (citing Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967)). In Associated Press, the Supreme Court further
clarified the extension of the actual malice standard to plaintiffs who are public figures.
Id.
22
New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
23
Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Nevertheless, in a distinct line
of cases, the Court has recognized that there are constitutional limits to the type of
speech to which state tort may attach.” (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S.
1, 26 (1990))).
16
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In Hustler Magazine, the Supreme Court’s focus shifted from the intent of
speech‐based tort defendants to the content of the speech itself.24 Convinced
that no reasonable person would interpret a pornography magazine’s parody of
a famous pastor to be asserting facts about the pastor, the Court declined to
grant relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress.25 This “content‐based”
approach was further illustrated in Milkovich.26 There, a newspaper columnist
was charged with libel after alleging that a wrestling coach committed perjury.27
The Court reasoned that “a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
statements in the column imply an assertion that petitioner perjured himself.”28
Judge King – who delivered the majority opinion in Snyder – relied on this
quotation to explain how he was obliged to focus on the “plain language” and
“general tenor” of Westboro’s offensive statements.29
Members of Westboro recently challenged the constitutionality of
statutes that regulate funeral picketing in separate actions.30 These cases
present similar First Amendment questions, but are analyzed in a different
context.31 In determining whether a statute inhibits First Amendment rights,
Courts have considered whether a statute is “content‐neutral”32 and narrowly
tailored to a government interest.33 Although these concerns are not apposite in
Snyder,34 it bears mentioning that Westboro recently convinced the Eighth
Circuit to enjoin enforcement of an anti‐picketing statute in Missouri.35 The Eight
Circuit conceded that Westboro has a “viable argument” that it may only get its
24

See id.; cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1987) (“Generally speaking, the law
does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive
much solicitude . . .”); id. at 50 (“Respondent would have us . . . deny protection . . .
even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual
facts.”).
25
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 50.
26
See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222 (4th Cir. 2009).
27
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23.
28
Id. at 21.
29
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 (4th Cir. 2009).
30
See Phelps‐Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008); Phelps‐Roper v. Nixon,
545 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2008).
31
See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 217 n.10 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Snyder v. Phelps,
533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578–79 (D. Md. 2008) (distinguishing speech‐based tort claims from
constitutional challenges to statutory prohibitions)).
32
A statute is “content‐neutral” if it is justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000).
33
A “content‐neutral” regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and must be
narrowly tailored to a significant government interest. McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F.
Supp. 2d 975, 981 (E.D. Ky. 2006). A “content‐based” regulation is subject to heightened
scrutiny, and must be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. Id.
34
Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35
Phelps‐Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d at 694.
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message across by picketing at military funerals.36 It behooves Snyder to
convince the Supreme Court otherwise.
A. The Road to the Supreme Court
1. The Road to the Fourth Circuit
No father should ever have to lose a son. Unfortunately, Albert Snyder
suffered such a loss. His son, Matthew, was tragically killed while serving in Iraq
on March 3, 2006.37 Snyder just wanted to bury Matthews and move on. The
members of Westboro Church had other plans.
Shortly after Matthew’s funeral, Snyder turned on the television.38 What
he saw has haunted him ever since; “You’re Going to Hell,” “Thank God for Dead
Soldiers,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and “Fags Doom Nations.”39 These were just
several of the messages featured prominently on picket signs by members of
Westboro Church outside Matthew’s funeral.40 Besides traumatizing Snyder,41
the messages piqued his curiosity about Westboro. Sometime around a month
after the funeral, Snyder discovered an “Epic” online entitled “The Burden of
Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”42 The Epic stated that Snyder and his wife
“taught Matthew to defy the Creator,” “raised [Matthew] for the Devil,” and
“taught Matt that God was a liar.”43
It is important to note that Westboro only picketed within a designated
public area and stopped before the funeral started.44 In fact, Westboro
contacted local authorities beforehand to make sure they complied with all
ordinances.45 Furthermore, the Epic was not deliberately made accessible to
Snyder.46 However, Snyder didn’t care – he wasn’t about to let Westboro get
away with such heinous actions. In June 2006, Snyder filed a complaint with the

36

Id.
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009).
38
Id. at 212.
39
Id. at 212, 222.
40
Id. at 212.
41
See id. at 213.
42
See id. at 212 (“Snyder learned that there was a reference to his son on the Internet
after running a search on google.”); see also Brief for Respondents at 9‐10, Snyder v.
Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 230 (Shedd, J., concurring).
45
Id. (Shedd, J., concurring).
46
Id. at 210; see also id. at 213.
37
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U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.47 Snyder alleged five tort claims,
two of which were dismissed.48
The case proceeded to trial in October 2007 on the remaining three tort
claims. The district court instructed the jury to determine whether Westboro’s
actions were directed at Snyder and his family; and if so, then whether the
actions would be (1) highly offensive to a reasonable person, (2) extreme and
outrageous, and (3) so offensive and shocking as to not be entitled to First
Amendment protection.50 The jury answered in the affirmative and Snyder was
ultimately awarded $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $2.1 million in
punitive damages.51 Westboro appealed.52
49

2. Judge King Makes His Mark
After hearing arguments in December 2008, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court’s judgment in September 2009.53 Rather than explore the merit
of Snyder’s actual tort claims, Judge King focused on the First Amendment.54
King took an aggressive, self‐aggrandizing stance,55 and provided a barrage of
quotations lauding freedom of expression.56
After dismissing the Gertz analysis offered by the district court,57 Judge
King advocated for the content‐based approach illustrated in Milkovich and
Hustler Magazine, Inc.58 The Fourth Circuit determined as a matter of law that
Westboro’s activities were not directed at Snyder or his son.59 In reversing the
47

Id. at 212.
Id. at 210; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
49
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at page i, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec.
23, 2009).
50
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 2009).
51
Id. at 216.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 206.
54
See id. at 216–26.
55
E.g., id. at 218 (“[W]e have the obligation to ‘make an independent examination of
the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’” (citation omitted)).
56
E.g., id. at 226 (“[T]hese liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of citizens of a democracy.” (quoting Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940))).
57
See id. at 222 (explaining that the district court focused on whether Snyder was a
“public figure” and whether Matthew’s funeral was a “public event.”).
58
See id. (“[W]e must assess the content of the Defendants’ protest signs as well as the
Epic, and determine whether such speech is entitled to constitutional protection.”); see
also supra Part II.
59
See id. at 223.
48
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judgment,60 King also explicated the language of the signs as “imaginative and
hyperbolic rhetoric” that could not be objectively verified.61 There is no silver
lining in King’s words for Snyder, who faces an uphill battle before the Supreme
Court
3. Judge Shedd’s Concurrence
In a logical and forthright concurrence, Judge Shedd abstained from
discussing the First Amendment.62 Rather, he focused on the sufficiency of the
evidence of Snyder’s claims.63 Although the sufficiency of the evidence was only
raised by amicus curiae,64 Shedd convincingly argued that should not preclude
the Court from addressing a legal issue.65 Shedd asserted that Westboro’s
actions did not constitute “intrusion”66 or “extreme and outrageous conduct.”67
Consequently, Shedd concluded that Snyder’s invasion of privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims must fail.68 This viewpoint is expounded
upon in Part IV.
B. The Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Judgment
1. What Privacy Interest?
Snyder’s invasion of privacy claim does not appear to be within the scope
of his certiorari petition.69 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling will
undoubtedly impact the legal world’s perception of “privacy;” specifically, the
direction the Court is moving in with respect to the “captive audience” and “right
60

Id. at 226.
Id.
62
Id. at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring) (“Because the appeal can be decided on this non‐
constitutional basis, I would not reach the First Amendment issue addressed by the
majority.”).
63
See id (Shedd, J., concurring).
64
Id. at 228 (Shedd, J., concurring).
65
Id. at 227–28 (Shedd, J., concurring) (advocating for the constitutional avoidance
doctrine).
66
Id. at 230 (Shedd, J., concurring) (“[I]t is clear that there was no type of ‘intrusion’
under any of the bases that Snyder asserts.”).
67
Id. at 232 (Shedd, J., concurring) (“[T]his conduct simply does not satisfy the heavy
burden required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . .”).
68
Id. at 233 (Shedd, J., concurring). Judge Shedd did not discuss the civil conspiracy
claim. Shedd noted that the unlawful activity required for civil conspiracy was the
substantive offense of the other two tort claims. Thus, the civil conspiracy claim must
fail as well. Id. at 232 n.3 (Shedd, J., concurring).
69
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i‐ii, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23,
2009).
61
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to privacy in public spaces” doctrines. Both standards have been sharply debated
amongst the Supreme Court.
“The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive
speech when the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech.”70
The Supreme Court has applied this rationale in upholding statutes that protect
unwilling listeners in residential neighborhoods and outside healthcare
facilities.71 The Court has not, however, applied it in the context of a funeral or
other religious gathering.72
Snyder asserts that Westboro disrupted his “peaceful assembly and
mourning process,”73 but what disruption he refers to is unclear. Snyder did
peacefully assemble with family and friends to mourn his son, and certainly was
not held “captive” while doing so.74 To buttress his argument, Snyder
emphasizes the “vulgar, offensive, and shocking” content of Westboro’s
activities.75 Yet, the Supreme Court has consistently downplayed the substance
of unwanted communication, focusing on the manner of its delivery instead.76
More broadly, the Court has associated one’s privacy interest in avoiding
unwanted communication with the ability to “avert one’s eyes,”77 and “the right
to be left alone.”78
Snyder was left alone – he never needed to avert his eyes. In fact, Snyder
purposefully directed his eyes towards Matthew’s Epic by locating it via the
70

Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (1987) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
71
See Hill, 530 U.S. at 735 (upholding a state statute requiring picketers to obtain
consent from unwilling listeners before approaching them); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487
(upholding a state statute banning picketing in front of residential homes, while noting
that such residents are a “captive audience.”).
72
Brief for Petitioner at 49, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. May 24, 2010).
73
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23,
2009).
74
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 230 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring); see also
supra Part III.A.
75
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 221 (4th Cir. 2009).
76
See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 990 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (“[I]t may not
be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault’ that
justifies proscription [of the speech].” (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
210‐11 (1975))).
77
See id. (“[O]ffended viewers can effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.” (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971))).
78
See id. at 991 (“The unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication
. . . is an aspect of the broader ‘right to be left alone.’” (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
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Internet.79 Even further, Snyder arguably averted his eyes towards the protest by
contacting the media to complain after the funeral.80 This could have led to
greater television coverage of the protest, increasing the likelihood that his
privacy would be “invaded.” The Supreme Court should accentuate these flaws
in Snyder’s argument to set some much‐needed boundaries on the captive
audience doctrine.
Likewise, the Supreme Court should clarify exactly what privacy interests
Snyder was entitled to. A funeral is a deeply personal occasion, where attendees
have an interest in avoiding unwanted communications “which is at least similar
to a person’s interest in avoiding such communications inside his home.”81
However, the Court has noted that “we are often captives outside the sanctuary
of the home and subject to objectionable speech.”82
The only people subject to Westboro’s picketing were hundreds of feet
away from the Church along a public right of way.83 Public ways are
“quintessential” forums for free expression.84 The Supreme Court has iterated
that it has “the obligation . . . to make sure that its judgment does not constitute
a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”85 By holding that Snyder’s
privacy interest was compromised, the Court would be doing just that.
Moreover, the Court would be opening the floodgates for invasion of
privacy claims.86 Take, for example, a fast food addict named Hugo.87 Hugo has
just arrived home after enjoying a tasty bucket of fried chicken at KFC. After
turning on the local news, Hugo notices a group of PETA members picketing
outside the KFC he just came from. PETA is publicizing its hatred for anyone
supporting KFC; protestors are carrying signs branding the restaurant’s
customers “CHICKEN KILLERS.” Not only is Hugo deeply offended, but he feels
79

See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
Brief for Respondents at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751, (U.S. May 24, 2010).
81
Id. at 992.
82
Id. at 988 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 91).
83
Brief for Respondents at 7, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. May 24, 2010).
84
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000); see also id. at 732 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“The streets are natural and proper places for dissemination of information and
opinion.” (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939))).
85
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2009).
86
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 13, on file
with University of Miami School of Law Library) (discussing potential causes of action for
invasion of privacy, such as posting offensive material in college dorms).
87
“Hugo” is based on Hugo Reyes, a featured character on the popular television show
“Lost.” Hugo was a frequent patron of Mr. Cluck's restaurant, a fictional restaurant
based on KFC.
80
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like a murderer. In fact, Hugo doesn’t feel comfortable eating chicken ever again.
It seems preposterous to imagine that Hugo would have a legitimate invasion of
privacy claim arising from these circumstances. Yet, a Supreme Court judgment
for Snyder would suggest the privacy interest one enjoys at home may be
intruded upon by offensive television. Hugo could conceivably sue KFC for
millions of dollars!88
2. Outrageous Speech is Not Outrageous Conduct
The Restatement (Third) of Torts imparts that “the law [of intentional
infliction of emotional distress] is still in a stage of development, and the
ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”89 In Snyder, the Supreme
Court could expand these limits incalculably. Consider that “the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is rarely viable, and is to be used
sparingly and only for the opprobrious behavior that includes truly outrageous
conduct.”90Now, consider the allegations of outrageous conduct in Snyder:
Snyder asserts that the protest was extreme and outrageous
because [1] the funeral was disrupted by having the procession
re‐routed; [2] his grieving process was disrupted by his having
to worry about his daughters observing the Phelps’ protest; and
[3] the Phelps’ messages on their protest signs were focused on
his family.91

The first two assertions are dubious at best. Re‐routing a funeral
procession to an alternate entrance92 is inconvenient, but hardly disruptive
enough to warrant “severe emotional distress.”93 Likewise, outside distractions
are always disrupting peoples’ lives – even at funerals. Take Michael Jackson’s
father for instance. Surely his grieving process was “disrupted” during his son’s
memorial at the Staples Center. Snyder is clearly reaching for a nonexistent
cause of action by alleging concern for his daughters’ welfare in this context.

88

In addition to $2.9 million in compensatory damages, Snyder was awarded $6 million
by the jury in punitive damages for his invasion of privacy claim. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 589 (D. Md. 2009). Snyder’s total award of punitive damages was later
reduced to $2.1 million. Id. at 597.
89
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965).
90
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 231 (4th Cir. 2009) (Shedd, J., concurring).
91
Id. at 232 (Shedd, J., concurring).
92
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. May 24, 2010).
93
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (noting the elements of intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
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The third assertion poses a more complex legal question to which the
Fourth Circuit devoted more extensive analysis.94 The messages displayed by
Westboro certainly appear to be outrageous affront to Snyder’s family in a
traditional sense.95 (This is particularly evident in the Epic.96) Ironically however,
this very outrageousness negates the assertion that the messages focused on
Snyder’s family. As the Fourth Circuit pointed out, a reasonable reader would
interpret Westboro’s communications as “loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language” not directed towards a specific person.97
The Supreme Court should not expand the limits of intentional infliction
of emotional distress to encompass such “rhetorical hyperbole.”98 A judgment
for Snyder would accelerate the tort’s “development;”99 it would evolve into
something more akin to strict liability than an intentional tort. Protestors would
be liable for messages clearly directed at society as a whole. Consequently, they
would start constraining their actions and published material. Such
self‐censorship runs afoul of Justice Powell’s contention that “[u]nder the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”100
III. CONCLUSION
The members of Westboro Church victimized Albert Snyder; the law
should provide some sort of remedy. Unfortunately, such a remedy is only
available at the expense of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting,
and even outrageous speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”101 Maryland can and should
pass a content‐neutral, narrowly tailored statute to prevent similar case s from
arising in the future.102 But in regards to Snyder, the Court ought to
demonstrate the same constraint advanced by the Fourth Circuit.103 Damaged
94

See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222–26 (4th Cir. 2009); see also supra Part III.B.
Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d passim (4th Cir. 2009) (identifying picket signs and
quoting language from the Epic).
96
See id. at 225 (“[God] killed Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity
to preach His words to . . . the whorehouse called St. John Catholic Church at
Westminster where Matthew Snyder fulfilled his calling.” (citation omitted)).
97
See id. at 224 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)).
98
Id.
99
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965).
100
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530
U.S. 703, 746 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[S]upression of uncongenial ideas is the
worst offense against the First Amendment . . . ”).
101
McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
102
See supra notes 7, 32–33 and accompanying text.
103
See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 226 (4th Cir. 2009).
95

308

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

emotions must yield to constitutional protections, lest the spirit of the First
Amendment becomes a phantom.

